Publications and talks
Published (9) · Under review (5) · In progress (8) · Talks (51) · Workshops (3)
Published
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Why are the Social Sciences Hard? Two New Hypotheses
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 119, article 102197.
Proposes two reasons the social sciences are hard: researchers are committed to a fixed set of prediction targets and cannot switch to more tractable ones, and human baseline performance on easy behavioral predictions is already high. Offers a formal framework for judging how hard a discipline is and how much its achievements mean.
JournalPDFCite
@article{social-sciences-hard, author = {Mohseni, Aydin and Herrmann, Daniel A. and Orona, Gabe Avakian}, title = {Why are the Social Sciences Hard? Two New Hypotheses}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science}, volume = {119}, pages = {102197}, year = {2026}, doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102197}, } -
The Role of Modeling in Improving Science
Philosophy Compass, forthcoming (commissioned).
Cite
@article{role-of-modeling, author = {Mohseni, Aydin}, title = {The Role of Modeling in Improving Science}, journal = {Philosophy Compass}, note = {Forthcoming}, } -
Methods for Modelers of Science
In Methods in the Philosophy of Science: A User’s Guide, eds. Sophie J. Veigl and Adrian Currie. The MIT Press, 2025.
A guide for philosophers and metascientists who model science: the implicit know-how of modeling, and the challenges and good practices of studying the social and epistemic structure of research.
JournalPDFCite
@incollection{methods-for-modelers, author = {Mohseni, Aydin}, title = {Methods for Modelers of Science}, booktitle = {Methods in the Philosophy of Science: A User's Guide}, editor = {Veigl, Sophie J. and Currie, Adrian}, publisher = {The MIT Press}, pages = {485--506}, year = {2025}, doi = {10.7551/mitpress/15452.003.0036}, } -
The Best Paper You’ll Read Today: Media Biases and the Public Understanding of Science
Philosophical Topics 50(2): 127–153.
Computational models of how journalists’ selection and sharing of scientific evidence shape public belief. Standard practices can distort belief substantially, existing errors can compound, some practices that look harmless do real epistemic harm, and some drive polarization.
JournalPDFPreprintModelCodeCite
@article{best-paper, author = {Mohseni, Aydin and O'Connor, Cailin and Weatherall, James Owen}, title = {The Best Paper You'll Read Today: Media Biases and the Public Understanding of Science}, journal = {Philosophical Topics}, volume = {50}, number = {2}, pages = {127--153}, year = {2022}, doi = {10.5840/philtopics202250220}, } -
The Tragedy of the AI Commons
Synthese 200(4), article 289.
Compliance with AI ethics guidelines as a social dilemma, modeled with stochastic evolutionary game dynamics, and the conditions under which cooperation among developers can hold. Stochastic effects can make cooperation viable, which suggests coordinating in smaller groups where cooperation is cheap and the risk of failure is high.
JournalPDFarXiv:2006.05203ModelCodeCite
@article{ai-commons, author = {LaCroix, Travis and Mohseni, Aydin}, title = {The Tragedy of the AI Commons}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {200}, number = {4}, pages = {289}, year = {2022}, doi = {10.1007/s11229-022-03763-2}, } -
Truth and Conformity on Networks
Erkenntnis 86(6): 1509–1530.
Agents learn by Bayesian conditionalization from private evidence and from what their neighbors say, while trading accuracy against conformity. Networks that sustain a diversity of opinion support honest communication and reliable true belief; less centralized and less connected networks do best.
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On the Emergence of Minority Disadvantage: Testing the Cultural Red King Hypothesis
Synthese 198(6): 5599–5621.
Tests whether a difference in group size alone can produce inequitable outcomes for a minority, without explicit or implicit bias. In experiments with 112 participants playing a repeated Nash demand game, members of the minority group made low demands more often and received lower payoffs.
JournalPDFDataSlidesCite
@article{red-king, author = {Mohseni, Aydin and O'Connor, Cailin and Rubin, Hannah}, title = {On the Emergence of Minority Disadvantage: Testing the Cultural Red King Hypothesis}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {198}, number = {6}, pages = {5599--5621}, year = {2021}, doi = {10.1007/s11229-019-02424-1}, } -
Self-Assembling Networks
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70(1): 301–325.
How an epistemic network might form from the reinforcement-learning decisions of inquirers who differ in ability. Such networks can outperform solitary inquiry and reduce epistemic risk; the paper compares them under perfect and imperfect communication.
JournalPDFModelCodeCite
@article{self-assembling-networks, author = {Barrett, Jeffrey A. and Skyrms, Brian and Mohseni, Aydin}, title = {Self-Assembling Networks}, journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, volume = {70}, number = {1}, pages = {301--325}, year = {2019}, doi = {10.1093/bjps/axx039}, } -
Stochastic Stability and Disagreements between Dynamics
Philosophy of Science 86(3): 497–521.
The replicator dynamics and the Moran process can make different predictions. The paper traces the divergence to standard analytic techniques and to the idealizations each model makes, identifies problems for stochastic stability analysis in a broad class of games, and identifies a domain where the two dynamics agree.
Years are those of the printed volume. Online-first dates are on the journal pages.
Under review
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A Bayesian Reduction of Causation
Causal reasoning in structural causal models reduces to subjective probability once interventions are treated as events in the world. The paper gives a de Finetti-style representation theorem.
PDFExProof AICite
@unpublished{bayesian-causation, author = {Herrmann, Daniel A. and Mohseni, Aydin and Levinstein, Benjamin A. and Rushing, Bruce}, title = {A Bayesian Reduction of Causation}, year = {2026}, note = {Under review}, } -
Learning the Value of Value Learning
Extends the Jeffrey–Bolker framework to the refinement of values, with a value-of-information theorem for learning what one values. Between agents, mutual refinement tends to turn zero-sum games into positive-sum ones and can yield Pareto improvements in Nash bargaining.
arXiv:2511.17714ExProof AICite
@unpublished{value-of-value-learning, author = {London, Alex John and Mohseni, Aydin}, title = {Learning the Value of Value Learning}, year = {2025}, note = {Under review}, } -
HARKing: from Misunderstanding to Misprescription
The usual explanations of why hypothesizing after the results are known (HARKing) harms reliability are mistaken. Its effect depends on how the prior probabilities of hypotheses chosen before and after seeing the data differ, and misdiagnosing it leads to poor reforms.
PDFPhilSci ArchiveModelCite
@unpublished{harking, author = {Mohseni, Aydin}, title = {HARKing: from Misunderstanding to Misprescription}, year = {2020}, note = {Revise and resubmit}, } -
Replication, Reform, and an Interventional Simpson’s Paradox
Shows that reforms meant to raise reliability, such as lowering the significance threshold or adopting voluntary preregistration, can improve every individual study yet worsen the published literature, because they filter sound studies more stringently than unsound ones. The result is an interventional Simpson’s paradox, and it holds for false-discovery rates, sign errors and exaggeration ratios alike.
Cite
@unpublished{replication-simpsons, author = {Mohseni, Aydin}, title = {Replication, Reform, and an Interventional Simpson's Paradox}, note = {Under review}, } -
Limitations of Equilibrium Concepts in Evolutionary Games
Gives an explicit definition of evolutionary significance and uses it to show that proposed equilibrium refinements make errors of omission or commission, even under favorable assumptions.
In progress
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Why and How to Do Science When AI Is Better at It: A Framework Grounded in Human Understanding and Direction
Science should keep aiming at shared human understanding, and that aim decides which research tasks AI can take over. From this aim the paper derives a two-part test, human understanding and human direction, for when a research task can be delegated to AI, and applies it to each phase of research.
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Bayes-Optimal Automated AI Safety Research via Judgement Aggregation under Resource Constraints
Bayesian models of how to allocate compute across many AI agents doing open-ended safety research: pooling AI judges’ estimates of which approaches are promising, then dividing a finite budget among them, so that safety research goes faster per unit of compute. Tested on automated theorem proving, where success can be checked.
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A Bayesian Model of Grant Funding
A Bayesian model of grant funding in which research output depends on both talent and resources, and funding compounds talent over time. The optimal allocation funds the gap between capabilities and resources; the model compares strategies from peer review to uniform seed funding.
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AI Alignment as a Principal-Agent Problem
Formal models of delegation, incentives, and misalignment.
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Goodman’s Riddle & the Replicability of Interaction Effects
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Changing Scientific Norms: Epistemic Trade-Offs from Classical and Bayesian Perspectives
Questions the focus on raising replication rates, from the frequentist and the Bayesian meta-analyst’s perspectives in turn. Argues that the Bayesian value of sample information, underused in the replication-crisis literature, clarifies standing puzzles, and that norms for good science must make a field’s values and risk preferences explicit.
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Stochasticity and Intermediate Evolutionary Regimes
Talks
Upcoming
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A Bayesian Reduction of Causation
Philosophy of Science Association Biennial, San Diego. With Daniel Herrmann.
All talks
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A Bayesian Model of Optimal Science Funding
- Manifest Conference, Berkeley, 2026 invited
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A Mathematical Unification of Learning and Evolution
- ILIAD 2026 Conference, Berkeley, 2026 invited
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Virtues and Vices of Analytic Philosophy with Respect to AI Safety
- ILIAD 2026 Conference, Berkeley, 2026 invited with Daniel Herrmann
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A Bayesian Reduction of Causation
- Philosophy of Science Association Biennial, San Diego, November 2026 (upcoming) with Daniel Herrmann
- The Society for Philosophy of Causation Conference, Paris, 2026
- PhilML’26 Philosophy of Machine Learning Conference, Munich, 2026
- PPE 9th Annual Meeting, New Orleans, 2025 invited
- ILIAD 2025 Conference: ODYSSEY, Berkeley, 2025 invited
- Center for Philosophy of Science Lunch Time Talks, Pittsburgh, 19 September 2025 invited Video
- 4th Formal and Experimental Philosophy Conference, Amherst, 2025 invited
- 12th Workshop on Combining Probability and Logic, Pittsburgh, 2025
- Logic and Philosophy of Science Colloquium, Irvine, 2025 invited
- Agent Foundations Workshop, Pittsburgh, 2025 invited
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Learning the Value of Value Learning
- Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Conference, London, 2026
- Beyond Basic Bayesianism Workshop, Helsinki, 2026
- Formal Ethics Workshop, Buffalo, 2026
- Agent Foundations Conference, Pittsburgh, 2026
- ILIAD 2025 Conference: ODYSSEY, Berkeley, 2025 invited
- ICSD Workshop, Pittsburgh, 2024
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Intervention and Backfire in the Replication Crisis
- Center for Philosophy of Science, Pittsburgh, 2025 invited Video
- Philosophy of Science Association Biennial, Baltimore, 2021
- Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice Biennial, Lansing, 2020
- Public Choice Society Annual Meeting, Newport Beach, 2020 invited
- Philosophy of Social Science Round Table, Atlanta, 2020
- 12th Munich-Sydney-Tilburg/Turin (MuST) Conference in Philosophy of Science, Munich, 2019
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AI Alignment as a Principal-Agent Problem
- Foundations of Cooperative AI Lab Seminar, Pittsburgh, 2024
- Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Society Conference, New Orleans, 2024
- Philosophy of Science Meets Machine Learning Conference, Tübingen, 2024
- ILIAD Conference, Berkeley, 2024 invited
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Bayesian Epistemology: Foundations, Limits, and Open Questions
- ILIAD Conference, Berkeley, 2024 invited
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Why are the Social Sciences Hard? Two New Hypotheses
- Ninth Quadrennial Fellows Conference, Miami, 2024
- Formal and Experimental Philosophy Workshop, Pittsburgh, 2023
- CLMPST: Science and Values in an Uncertain World, Buenos Aires, 2023
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HARKing: from Misunderstanding to Misprescription
- Scientific Progress: Individual and Collective, Amsterdam, 2022 invited
- Society for Philosophy and Psychology Annual Meeting, Virtual, 2021
- Center for Philosophy of Science, Lunch Time Talk, Pittsburgh, 2021 invited
- ANPOSS/ENPOSS/POSS-RT Joint Conference, Tokyo, 2021
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On the Emergence of Minority Disadvantage
- APA: Central Division Meeting, Denver, 2019 invited
- APA: Pacific Division Meeting, Vancouver, 2019
- Agent-Based Models in Philosophy Conference, Bochum, 2019
- Philosophy, Politics & Economics Society Meeting, New Orleans, 2019 invited
- Philosophy and Complex Systems Seminar, Moscow, 2018 invited
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Truth and Conformity on Networks
- Philosophy of Science Association Biennial, Seattle, 2018
- Computational Modeling in Philosophy Conference, Munich, 2018
- Formal Social Epistemology Workshop, Irvine, 2018 invited
- IMBS R. D. Luce Conference, Irvine, 2017
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Stochastic Stability and Disagreements Between Dynamics
- Generalized Theory of Evolution Conference, Düsseldorf, 2018
- Infinite Idealizations in Science Conference, Munich, 2017
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- IMBS R. D. Luce Conference, Irvine, 2015
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Limitations of Equilibrium Concepts in Evolutionary Games
- International Society for History, Philosophy & Social Studies of Biology Biennial Meeting, Montreal, 2015
- Decisions, Games and Logic Conference, London, 2015