Aydin Mohseni

Publications

Recent preprints (2) · Published (9) · Under review (5) · In progress (7)

Recent preprints

  1. 2026Preprint

    Human-AI Mutualism Is Unstable under Capability Asymmetry

    Abstract

    Hoping that humans and AI will need each other, and so keep the relationship good for both, is no substitute for alignment. In a game-theoretic model, humans stay as well off as before AI only while they have leverage over it; once they have none, only alignment protects them, and against an AI with insatiable goals the alignment required approaches perfect alignment as capability grows.

    Cite
    @unpublished{mutualism-asymmetry,
      author    = {Mohseni, Aydin},
      title     = {Human-AI Mutualism Is Unstable under Capability Asymmetry},
      year      = {2026},
      note      = {arXiv:2611.23322},
    }
  2. 2026Preprint

    Why and How to Do Science When AI Is Better at It: A Framework Grounded in Human Understanding and Direction

    With Hoda Heidari.

    Abstract

    Science should keep aiming at shared human understanding, and that aim decides which research tasks AI can take over. From this aim the paper derives a two-part test, human understanding and human direction, for when a research task can be delegated to AI, and applies it to each phase of research.

    Cite
    @unpublished{science-ai,
      author    = {Heidari, Hoda and Mohseni, Aydin},
      title     = {Why and How to Do Science When AI Is Better at It: A Framework Grounded in Human Understanding and Direction},
      year      = {2026},
      note      = {arXiv:2610.36116},
    }

Published

  1. 2026Article

    Why are the Social Sciences Hard? Two New Hypotheses

    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, with Daniel A. Herrmann and Gabe Avakian Orona.

    Abstract

    Proposes two reasons the social sciences are hard: researchers are committed to a fixed set of prediction targets and cannot switch to more tractable ones, and human baseline performance on easy behavioral predictions is already high. Offers a formal framework for judging how hard a discipline is and how much its achievements mean.

    Cite
    @article{social-sciences-hard,
      author    = {Mohseni, Aydin and Herrmann, Daniel A. and Orona, Gabe Avakian},
      title     = {Why are the Social Sciences Hard? Two New Hypotheses},
      journal   = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science},
      volume    = {119},
      pages     = {102197},
      year      = {2026},
      doi       = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2026.102197},
    }
  2. ForthcomingArticle

    The Role of Modeling in Improving Science

    Philosophy Compass, forthcoming (commissioned).

    Abstract

    A critical survey of formal models of the social structure and epistemic properties of science, and of the assumption that such models support meaningful inferences about them: what this research has shown, what it faces, and the pressing open questions.

    Cite
    @article{role-of-modeling,
      author    = {Mohseni, Aydin},
      title     = {The Role of Modeling in Improving Science},
      journal   = {Philosophy Compass},
      note      = {Forthcoming},
    }
  3. 2025Chapter

    Methods for Modelers of Science

    In Methods in the Philosophy of Science: A User’s Guide.

    Abstract

    A guide for philosophers and metascientists who model science: the implicit know-how of modeling, and the challenges and good practices of studying the social and epistemic structure of research.

    Cite
    @incollection{methods-for-modelers,
      author    = {Mohseni, Aydin},
      title     = {Methods for Modelers of Science},
      booktitle = {Methods in the Philosophy of Science: A User's Guide},
      editor    = {Veigl, Sophie J. and Currie, Adrian},
      publisher = {The MIT Press},
      pages     = {485--506},
      year      = {2025},
      doi       = {10.7551/mitpress/15452.003.0036},
    }
  4. 2022Article

    The Best Paper You’ll Read Today: Media Biases and the Public Understanding of Science

    Philosophical Topics, with Cailin O’Connor and James Owen Weatherall.

    Abstract

    Computational models of how journalists’ selection and sharing of scientific evidence shape public belief. Standard practices can distort belief substantially, existing errors can compound, some practices that look harmless do real epistemic harm, and some drive polarization.

    Cite
    @article{best-paper,
      author    = {Mohseni, Aydin and O'Connor, Cailin and Weatherall, James Owen},
      title     = {The Best Paper You'll Read Today: Media Biases and the Public Understanding of Science},
      journal   = {Philosophical Topics},
      volume    = {50},
      number    = {2},
      pages     = {127--153},
      year      = {2022},
      doi       = {10.5840/philtopics202250220},
    }
  5. 2022Article

    The Tragedy of the AI Commons

    Synthese, with Travis LaCroix.

    Abstract

    Compliance with AI ethics guidelines as a social dilemma, modeled with stochastic evolutionary game dynamics, and the conditions under which cooperation among developers can hold. Stochastic effects can make cooperation viable, which suggests coordinating in smaller groups where cooperation is cheap and the risk of failure is high.

    Cite
    @article{ai-commons,
      author    = {LaCroix, Travis and Mohseni, Aydin},
      title     = {The Tragedy of the AI Commons},
      journal   = {Synthese},
      volume    = {200},
      number    = {4},
      pages     = {289},
      year      = {2022},
      doi       = {10.1007/s11229-022-03763-2},
    }
  6. 2021Article

    Truth and Conformity on Networks

    Erkenntnis, with Cole Randall Williams.

    Abstract

    Agents learn by Bayesian conditionalization from private evidence and from what their neighbors say, while trading accuracy against conformity. Networks that sustain a diversity of opinion support honest communication and reliable true belief; less centralized and less connected networks do best.

    Cite
    @article{truth-and-conformity,
      author    = {Mohseni, Aydin and Williams, Cole Randall},
      title     = {Truth and Conformity on Networks},
      journal   = {Erkenntnis},
      volume    = {86},
      number    = {6},
      pages     = {1509--1530},
      year      = {2021},
      doi       = {10.1007/s10670-019-00167-6},
    }
  7. 2021Article

    On the Emergence of Minority Disadvantage: Testing the Cultural Red King Hypothesis

    Synthese, with Cailin O’Connor and Hannah Rubin.

    Abstract

    Tests whether a difference in group size alone can produce inequitable outcomes for a minority, without explicit or implicit bias. In experiments with 112 participants playing a repeated Nash demand game, members of the minority group made low demands more often and received lower payoffs.

    Cite
    @article{red-king,
      author    = {Mohseni, Aydin and O'Connor, Cailin and Rubin, Hannah},
      title     = {On the Emergence of Minority Disadvantage: Testing the Cultural Red King Hypothesis},
      journal   = {Synthese},
      volume    = {198},
      number    = {6},
      pages     = {5599--5621},
      year      = {2021},
      doi       = {10.1007/s11229-019-02424-1},
    }
  8. 2019Article

    Self-Assembling Networks

    The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, with Jeffrey A. Barrett and Brian Skyrms.

    Abstract

    How an epistemic network might form from the reinforcement-learning decisions of inquirers who differ in ability. Such networks can outperform solitary inquiry and reduce epistemic risk; the paper compares them under perfect and imperfect communication.

    Cite
    @article{self-assembling-networks,
      author    = {Barrett, Jeffrey A. and Skyrms, Brian and Mohseni, Aydin},
      title     = {Self-Assembling Networks},
      journal   = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
      volume    = {70},
      number    = {1},
      pages     = {301--325},
      year      = {2019},
      doi       = {10.1093/bjps/axx039},
    }
  9. 2019Article

    Stochastic Stability and Disagreements between Dynamics

    Philosophy of Science.

    Abstract

    The replicator dynamics and the Moran process can make different predictions. The paper traces the divergence to standard analytic techniques and to the idealizations each model makes, identifies problems for stochastic stability analysis in a broad class of games, and identifies a domain where the two dynamics agree.

    Cite
    @article{stochastic-stability,
      author    = {Mohseni, Aydin},
      title     = {Stochastic Stability and Disagreements between Dynamics},
      journal   = {Philosophy of Science},
      volume    = {86},
      number    = {3},
      pages     = {497--521},
      year      = {2019},
      doi       = {10.1086/703581},
    }

Years are those of the printed volume. Online-first dates are on the journal pages.

Under review

  1. 2026Paper

    A Bayesian Reduction of Causation

    With Daniel A. Herrmann, Benjamin A. Levinstein, and Bruce Rushing.

    Abstract

    Causal reasoning in structural causal models reduces to subjective probability once interventions are treated as events in the world. The paper gives a de Finetti-style representation theorem.

    Cite
    @unpublished{bayesian-causation,
      author    = {Herrmann, Daniel A. and Mohseni, Aydin and Levinstein, Benjamin A. and Rushing, Bruce},
      title     = {A Bayesian Reduction of Causation},
      year      = {2026},
      note      = {Under review},
    }
  2. 2025Paper

    Learning the Value of Value Learning

    With Alex John London.

    Abstract

    Extends the Jeffrey–Bolker framework to the refinement of values, with a value-of-information theorem for learning what one values. Between agents, mutual refinement tends to turn zero-sum games into positive-sum ones and can yield Pareto improvements in Nash bargaining.

    Cite
    @unpublished{value-of-value-learning,
      author    = {London, Alex John and Mohseni, Aydin},
      title     = {Learning the Value of Value Learning},
      year      = {2025},
      note      = {Under review},
    }
  3. 2020Revise and resubmit

    HARKing: from Misunderstanding to Misprescription

    Abstract

    The usual explanations of why hypothesizing after the results are known (HARKing) harms reliability are mistaken. Its effect depends on how the prior probabilities of hypotheses chosen before and after seeing the data differ, and misdiagnosing it leads to poor reforms.

    Cite
    @unpublished{harking,
      author    = {Mohseni, Aydin},
      title     = {HARKing: from Misunderstanding to Misprescription},
      year      = {2020},
      note      = {Revise and resubmit},
    }
  4. Paper

    Replication, Reform, and an Interventional Simpson’s Paradox

    Abstract

    Shows that reforms meant to raise reliability, such as lowering the significance threshold or adopting voluntary preregistration, can improve every individual study yet worsen the published literature, because they filter sound studies more stringently than unsound ones. The result is an interventional Simpson’s paradox, and it holds for false-discovery rates, sign errors and exaggeration ratios alike.

    Cite
    @unpublished{replication-simpsons,
      author    = {Mohseni, Aydin},
      title     = {Replication, Reform, and an Interventional Simpson's Paradox},
      note      = {Under review},
    }
  5. 2019Paper

    Limitations of Equilibrium Concepts in Evolutionary Games

    Abstract

    Gives an explicit definition of evolutionary significance and uses it to show that proposed equilibrium refinements make errors of omission or commission, even under favorable assumptions.

    Cite
    @unpublished{equilibrium-concepts,
      author    = {Mohseni, Aydin},
      title     = {Limitations of Equilibrium Concepts in Evolutionary Games},
      year      = {2019},
      note      = {Under review},
    }

In progress

  1. Paper

    Bayes-Optimal Automated AI Safety Research via Judgement Aggregation under Resource Constraints

    With Yosra Kazemi and Yang Hu.

    Abstract

    Bayesian models of how to allocate compute across many AI agents doing open-ended safety research: pooling AI judges’ estimates of which approaches are promising, then dividing a finite budget among them, so that safety research goes faster per unit of compute. Tested on automated theorem proving, where success can be checked.

    Cite
    @unpublished{automated-safety-research,
      author    = {Mohseni, Aydin and Kazemi, Yosra and Hu, Yang},
      title     = {Bayes-Optimal Automated AI Safety Research via Judgement Aggregation under Resource Constraints},
      note      = {Manuscript},
    }
  2. Paper

    A Bayesian Model of Grant Funding

    With Kevin J. S. Zollman and Simon DeDeo.

    Abstract

    A Bayesian model of grant funding in which research output depends on both talent and resources, and funding compounds talent over time. The optimal allocation funds the gap between capabilities and resources; the model compares strategies from peer review to uniform seed funding.

    Cite
    @unpublished{bayesian-grant-funding,
      author    = {Mohseni, Aydin and Zollman, Kevin J. S. and DeDeo, Simon},
      title     = {A Bayesian Model of Grant Funding},
      note      = {Manuscript},
    }
  3. Paper

    AI Alignment as a Principal-Agent Problem

    With L. G. Demo.

    Abstract

    Formal models of delegation, incentives, and misalignment.

    Cite
    @unpublished{principal-agent,
      author    = {Mohseni, Aydin and Demo, L. G.},
      title     = {AI Alignment as a Principal-Agent Problem},
      note      = {Manuscript},
    }
  4. Paper

    Goodman’s Riddle & the Replicability of Interaction Effects

    Cite
    @unpublished{goodmans-riddle,
      author    = {Mohseni, Aydin},
      title     = {Goodman's Riddle & the Replicability of Interaction Effects},
      note      = {Manuscript},
    }
  5. Paper

    Changing Scientific Norms: Epistemic Trade-Offs from Classical and Bayesian Perspectives

    Abstract

    Questions the focus on raising replication rates, from the frequentist and the Bayesian meta-analyst’s perspectives in turn. Argues that the Bayesian value of sample information, underused in the replication-crisis literature, clarifies standing puzzles, and that norms for good science must make a field’s values and risk preferences explicit.

    Cite
    @unpublished{changing-norms,
      author    = {Mohseni, Aydin},
      title     = {Changing Scientific Norms: Epistemic Trade-Offs from Classical and Bayesian Perspectives},
      note      = {Manuscript},
    }
  6. Paper

    The Rationality of Nash Equilibria

    With Simon Huttegger.

    Abstract

    Reconciles Kalai and Lehrer’s result on Bayesian learning of Nash equilibrium with Foster and Young’s impossibility theorem, and argues that Bayesian learning gives a more robust justification of Nash play than Foster and Young suggest.

    Cite
    @unpublished{rationality-nash,
      author    = {Mohseni, Aydin and Huttegger, Simon},
      title     = {The Rationality of Nash Equilibria},
      note      = {Manuscript},
    }
  7. Paper

    Stochasticity and Intermediate Evolutionary Regimes

    Cite
    @unpublished{intermediate-regimes,
      author    = {Mohseni, Aydin},
      title     = {Stochasticity and Intermediate Evolutionary Regimes},
      note      = {Manuscript},
    }
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