Aydin Mohseni

Publications and talks

Published (9) · Under review (5) · In progress (8) · Talks (51) · Workshops (3)

Published

  1. 2026Article

    Why are the Social Sciences Hard? Two New Hypotheses

    Aydin Mohseni, Daniel A. Herrmann, and Gabe Avakian Orona

    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 119, article 102197.

    Proposes two reasons the social sciences are hard: researchers are committed to a fixed set of prediction targets and cannot switch to more tractable ones, and human baseline performance on easy behavioral predictions is already high. Offers a formal framework for judging how hard a discipline is and how much its achievements mean.

  2. ForthcomingArticle

    The Role of Modeling in Improving Science

    Aydin Mohseni

    Philosophy Compass, forthcoming (commissioned).

  3. 2025Chapter

    Methods for Modelers of Science

    Aydin Mohseni

    In Methods in the Philosophy of Science: A User’s Guide, eds. Sophie J. Veigl and Adrian Currie. The MIT Press, 2025.

    A guide for philosophers and metascientists who model science: the implicit know-how of modeling, and the challenges and good practices of studying the social and epistemic structure of research.

  4. 2022Article

    The Best Paper You’ll Read Today: Media Biases and the Public Understanding of Science

    Aydin Mohseni, Cailin O’Connor, and James Owen Weatherall

    Philosophical Topics 50(2): 127–153.

    Computational models of how journalists’ selection and sharing of scientific evidence shape public belief. Standard practices can distort belief substantially, existing errors can compound, some practices that look harmless do real epistemic harm, and some drive polarization.

  5. 2022Article

    The Tragedy of the AI Commons

    Travis LaCroix and Aydin Mohseni

    Synthese 200(4), article 289.

    Compliance with AI ethics guidelines as a social dilemma, modeled with stochastic evolutionary game dynamics, and the conditions under which cooperation among developers can hold. Stochastic effects can make cooperation viable, which suggests coordinating in smaller groups where cooperation is cheap and the risk of failure is high.

  6. 2021Article

    Truth and Conformity on Networks

    Aydin Mohseni and Cole Randall Williams

    Erkenntnis 86(6): 1509–1530.

    Agents learn by Bayesian conditionalization from private evidence and from what their neighbors say, while trading accuracy against conformity. Networks that sustain a diversity of opinion support honest communication and reliable true belief; less centralized and less connected networks do best.

  7. 2021Article

    On the Emergence of Minority Disadvantage: Testing the Cultural Red King Hypothesis

    Aydin Mohseni, Cailin O’Connor, and Hannah Rubin

    Synthese 198(6): 5599–5621.

    Tests whether a difference in group size alone can produce inequitable outcomes for a minority, without explicit or implicit bias. In experiments with 112 participants playing a repeated Nash demand game, members of the minority group made low demands more often and received lower payoffs.

  8. 2019Article

    Self-Assembling Networks

    Jeffrey A. Barrett, Brian Skyrms, and Aydin Mohseni

    The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70(1): 301–325.

    How an epistemic network might form from the reinforcement-learning decisions of inquirers who differ in ability. Such networks can outperform solitary inquiry and reduce epistemic risk; the paper compares them under perfect and imperfect communication.

  9. 2019Article

    Stochastic Stability and Disagreements between Dynamics

    Aydin Mohseni

    Philosophy of Science 86(3): 497–521.

    The replicator dynamics and the Moran process can make different predictions. The paper traces the divergence to standard analytic techniques and to the idealizations each model makes, identifies problems for stochastic stability analysis in a broad class of games, and identifies a domain where the two dynamics agree.

Years are those of the printed volume. Online-first dates are on the journal pages.

Under review

  1. 2026Paper

    A Bayesian Reduction of Causation

    Daniel A. Herrmann, Aydin Mohseni, Benjamin A. Levinstein, and Bruce Rushing

    Causal reasoning in structural causal models reduces to subjective probability once interventions are treated as events in the world. The paper gives a de Finetti-style representation theorem.

  2. 2025Paper

    Learning the Value of Value Learning

    Alex John London and Aydin Mohseni

    Extends the Jeffrey–Bolker framework to the refinement of values, with a value-of-information theorem for learning what one values. Between agents, mutual refinement tends to turn zero-sum games into positive-sum ones and can yield Pareto improvements in Nash bargaining.

  3. 2020Revise and resubmit

    HARKing: from Misunderstanding to Misprescription

    Aydin Mohseni

    The usual explanations of why hypothesizing after the results are known (HARKing) harms reliability are mistaken. Its effect depends on how the prior probabilities of hypotheses chosen before and after seeing the data differ, and misdiagnosing it leads to poor reforms.

  4. Paper

    Replication, Reform, and an Interventional Simpson’s Paradox

    Aydin Mohseni

    Shows that reforms meant to raise reliability, such as lowering the significance threshold or adopting voluntary preregistration, can improve every individual study yet worsen the published literature, because they filter sound studies more stringently than unsound ones. The result is an interventional Simpson’s paradox, and it holds for false-discovery rates, sign errors and exaggeration ratios alike.

  5. 2019Paper

    Limitations of Equilibrium Concepts in Evolutionary Games

    Aydin Mohseni

    Gives an explicit definition of evolutionary significance and uses it to show that proposed equilibrium refinements make errors of omission or commission, even under favorable assumptions.

In progress

  1. 2026Paper

    Why and How to Do Science When AI Is Better at It: A Framework Grounded in Human Understanding and Direction

    Hoda Heidari and Aydin Mohseni

    Science should keep aiming at shared human understanding, and that aim decides which research tasks AI can take over. From this aim the paper derives a two-part test, human understanding and human direction, for when a research task can be delegated to AI, and applies it to each phase of research.

  2. Paper

    Bayes-Optimal Automated AI Safety Research via Judgement Aggregation under Resource Constraints

    Aydin Mohseni, Yosra Kazemi, and Yang Hu

    Bayesian models of how to allocate compute across many AI agents doing open-ended safety research: pooling AI judges’ estimates of which approaches are promising, then dividing a finite budget among them, so that safety research goes faster per unit of compute. Tested on automated theorem proving, where success can be checked.

  3. Paper

    A Bayesian Model of Grant Funding

    Aydin Mohseni, Kevin J. S. Zollman, and Simon DeDeo

    A Bayesian model of grant funding in which research output depends on both talent and resources, and funding compounds talent over time. The optimal allocation funds the gap between capabilities and resources; the model compares strategies from peer review to uniform seed funding.

  4. Paper

    AI Alignment as a Principal-Agent Problem

    Aydin Mohseni and L. G. Demo

    Formal models of delegation, incentives, and misalignment.

  5. Paper

    Goodman’s Riddle & the Replicability of Interaction Effects

    Aydin Mohseni

  6. Paper

    Changing Scientific Norms: Epistemic Trade-Offs from Classical and Bayesian Perspectives

    Aydin Mohseni

    Questions the focus on raising replication rates, from the frequentist and the Bayesian meta-analyst’s perspectives in turn. Argues that the Bayesian value of sample information, underused in the replication-crisis literature, clarifies standing puzzles, and that norms for good science must make a field’s values and risk preferences explicit.

  7. Paper

    The Rationality of Nash Equilibria

    Aydin Mohseni and Simon Huttegger

    Reconciles Kalai and Lehrer’s result on Bayesian learning of Nash equilibrium with Foster and Young’s impossibility theorem, and argues that Bayesian learning gives a more robust justification of Nash play than Foster and Young suggest.

  8. Paper

    Stochasticity and Intermediate Evolutionary Regimes

    Aydin Mohseni

Talks

Upcoming

  1. November 2026Talk

    A Bayesian Reduction of Causation

    Philosophy of Science Association Biennial, San Diego. With Daniel Herrmann.

All talks

  1. 20261 talk

    A Bayesian Model of Optimal Science Funding

    • Manifest Conference, Berkeley, 2026 invited
  2. 20261 talk

    A Mathematical Unification of Learning and Evolution

    • ILIAD 2026 Conference, Berkeley, 2026 invited
  3. 20261 talk

    Virtues and Vices of Analytic Philosophy with Respect to AI Safety

    • ILIAD 2026 Conference, Berkeley, 2026 invited with Daniel Herrmann
  4. 2025–202610 talks

    A Bayesian Reduction of Causation

    • Philosophy of Science Association Biennial, San Diego, November 2026 (upcoming) with Daniel Herrmann
    • The Society for Philosophy of Causation Conference, Paris, 2026
    • PhilML’26 Philosophy of Machine Learning Conference, Munich, 2026
    • PPE 9th Annual Meeting, New Orleans, 2025 invited
    • ILIAD 2025 Conference: ODYSSEY, Berkeley, 2025 invited
    • Center for Philosophy of Science Lunch Time Talks, Pittsburgh, 19 September 2025 invited Video
    • 4th Formal and Experimental Philosophy Conference, Amherst, 2025 invited
    • 12th Workshop on Combining Probability and Logic, Pittsburgh, 2025
    • Logic and Philosophy of Science Colloquium, Irvine, 2025 invited
    • Agent Foundations Workshop, Pittsburgh, 2025 invited
  5. 2024–20266 talks

    Learning the Value of Value Learning

    • Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Conference, London, 2026
    • Beyond Basic Bayesianism Workshop, Helsinki, 2026
    • Formal Ethics Workshop, Buffalo, 2026
    • Agent Foundations Conference, Pittsburgh, 2026
    • ILIAD 2025 Conference: ODYSSEY, Berkeley, 2025 invited
    • ICSD Workshop, Pittsburgh, 2024
  6. 2019–20256 talks

    Intervention and Backfire in the Replication Crisis

    • Center for Philosophy of Science, Pittsburgh, 2025 invited Video
    • Philosophy of Science Association Biennial, Baltimore, 2021
    • Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice Biennial, Lansing, 2020
    • Public Choice Society Annual Meeting, Newport Beach, 2020 invited
    • Philosophy of Social Science Round Table, Atlanta, 2020
    • 12th Munich-Sydney-Tilburg/Turin (MuST) Conference in Philosophy of Science, Munich, 2019
  7. 20244 talks

    AI Alignment as a Principal-Agent Problem

    • Foundations of Cooperative AI Lab Seminar, Pittsburgh, 2024
    • Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Society Conference, New Orleans, 2024
    • Philosophy of Science Meets Machine Learning Conference, Tübingen, 2024
    • ILIAD Conference, Berkeley, 2024 invited
  8. 20241 talk

    Bayesian Epistemology: Foundations, Limits, and Open Questions

    • ILIAD Conference, Berkeley, 2024 invited
  9. 2023–20243 talks

    Why are the Social Sciences Hard? Two New Hypotheses

    • Ninth Quadrennial Fellows Conference, Miami, 2024
    • Formal and Experimental Philosophy Workshop, Pittsburgh, 2023
    • CLMPST: Science and Values in an Uncertain World, Buenos Aires, 2023
  10. 2021–20224 talks

    HARKing: from Misunderstanding to Misprescription

    • Scientific Progress: Individual and Collective, Amsterdam, 2022 invited
    • Society for Philosophy and Psychology Annual Meeting, Virtual, 2021
    • Center for Philosophy of Science, Lunch Time Talk, Pittsburgh, 2021 invited
    • ANPOSS/ENPOSS/POSS-RT Joint Conference, Tokyo, 2021
  11. 2018–20195 talks

    On the Emergence of Minority Disadvantage

    • APA: Central Division Meeting, Denver, 2019 invited
    • APA: Pacific Division Meeting, Vancouver, 2019
    • Agent-Based Models in Philosophy Conference, Bochum, 2019
    • Philosophy, Politics & Economics Society Meeting, New Orleans, 2019 invited
    • Philosophy and Complex Systems Seminar, Moscow, 2018 invited
  12. 2017–20184 talks

    Truth and Conformity on Networks

    • Philosophy of Science Association Biennial, Seattle, 2018
    • Computational Modeling in Philosophy Conference, Munich, 2018
    • Formal Social Epistemology Workshop, Irvine, 2018 invited
    • IMBS R. D. Luce Conference, Irvine, 2017
  13. 2017–20182 talks

    Stochastic Stability and Disagreements Between Dynamics

    • Generalized Theory of Evolution Conference, Düsseldorf, 2018
    • Infinite Idealizations in Science Conference, Munich, 2017
  14. 20151 talk

    Self-Assembling Networks

    • IMBS R. D. Luce Conference, Irvine, 2015
  15. 20152 talks

    Limitations of Equilibrium Concepts in Evolutionary Games

    • International Society for History, Philosophy & Social Studies of Biology Biennial Meeting, Montreal, 2015
    • Decisions, Games and Logic Conference, London, 2015
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